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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
This research and technology implications report is submitted to fulfill 
the requirements under Contract NAS 8-20682. The work summarized 
herein is a continuation of work carried out by the Avco Space Systems 
Division under Contract NAS 8-20502. The entirety of this work con- 
stitutes one facet of the NASA/MSFC program in support of the NASA 
advanced planetary missions - development of a typical Mars landing 
capsule sterilization container. 
In the initial contract (NAS 8-20502) a typical canister and mode probe 
were designed, fabricated and subjected to tests to demonstrate design 
features to minimize canister gas leakage (that might be indicative of 
violation passages in the bio-barrier) and to demonstrate the design 
adequacy of canister lid jettison and probe deployment features. The 
results of the original contract showed that such a typical canister could 
be designed, fabricated and tested within the bounds of current technology. 
However, that original program considered only a small portion of the 
total development requirements of a typical sterilization container - the 
mechanical design. 
The next logical question in the developmental sequence of a typical canis- 
ter is the ability of that canister to prevent recontamination of the contain- 
ed probe vehicle by earth organisms in the vehicle mission phases from 
terminal sterilization through probe deployment on a mission impact t ra-  
jectory. 
tamination could occur a r e  a s  follows: 
The sequence of mission phases where possible organism recon- 
Terminal Sterilization Cycle 
Storage 
Prelaunch Handling, A s s embly and Checkout 
Launch 
Canister Venting 
Cruise and Mid-Course Correction 
Canister Lid Jettison 
Probe Deployment 
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The ultimate objective of the current contract w a s  to ass is t  in establishing 
procedures f o r  use in certifying that operational capsule systems undergo 
minimum recontamination with microorganisms during the deployment 
mode, space cruise maneuvers and any other scheduled phases which 
threaten sterility. The specific objectives of the work reported herein 
were as follows; 
Determine whether the sterilization bar r ie r  is compromised 
during spacecraft cruise, canister opening o r  probe deploy- 
ment. 
Define a test  program to investigate release and transport 
mechanism s of microorganism s . 
Determine a suitable t racer  organism for use in transport 
tests 
Design, develop and fabricate fixtures and equipment to 
execute the transport test  program. 
Execute the approved tests; collect, analyze and interpret 
the data. 
Within the scope of the assumptions and guidelines set  forth in the contract, 
the following five a reas  of investigation received major emphasis: 
0 Survival Studies - selection of tracer organism, car r ie r  
material, surface finish and spore population fo r  ultrahigh 
vacuum, ambient control and ultraviolet exposures; execu- 
tion of these population survival studies for up to an eight 
month period. 
0 Transport Analysis - a theoretical evaluation of the possible 
recontamination hazard during space flight and deployment 
maneuvers including organism survival, conditions for 
organism release and particle movement in the interplanetary 
spacecraft environment. 
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0 Effects Tests - laboratory investigations of release mecha- 
nisms and spore particle charge characteristics. 
0 Witness Techniques - development, fabrication, and testing 
of separation joints, dispersion devices and witness methods 
to simulate the release of organisms from the unsterile outer 
surface of the flight hardware. 
0 Sterilization Certification Procedure - development of a prob- 
abilistic recontamination model and recommendation for grvund 
test certification. 
The following two sections present a summary of program results 
and suggested a reas  of further effort. 
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2.0 SUMMARY O F  PROGRAM RESULTS 
2.1 SURVIVAL STUDIES 
Bacillus globigii bacterial spores were selected a s  the t racer  or -  
ganisms for all phases of the survival and witness studies. For  the 
Survival Studies two sets of aluminum disks were inoculated, each 
with -5 x 10 6 spores. One set of disks was assigned to be placed 
in an ultrahigh vacuum chamber (10-8 to r r )  for exposure. The 
second control set was kept under ambient conditions. At various 
time intervals five disks were removed from the UHV chamber or 
from the control chamber and assayed for the number of survivors by 
ser ia l  dilutions and plating. 
month period a re  summarized in  Table I. 
written to analyze the above data in t e rms  of a least squares curve 
f i t  and a CHI2 test. The results indicate that the effect of ultrahigh 
vacuum alone on the survival of B. globigii spores over an eight- 
month period i s  slight when comGred to initial inocula populations. 
The control population remained surprisingly constant. It was con- 
cluded that B. globigii spores a r e  ideal test  organisms for long-term 
sterility certification procedures and that statistically valid experi- 
ments can be designed using the data presented which would yield 
meaningful recovery values over extended time periods. 
The results obtained over an eight- 
A computer program was 
Ultraviolet survival studies were carried out in separate vacuum 
chambers and using separate ambient controls. 
in this study (see Figure 1) point out the necessity of a heavy inoculum 
( -109) on the test  surface in a solar simulation test if significant 
numbers of organisms a re  to be recovered. 
high vacuum results in relatively small die-off values, the critical 
factors during a sterilization certification procedure appear to be 
the intensity and length of exposure to solar radiation. 
The data generated 
Since exposure to ul t ra-  
2.2 TRANSPORT ANALYSIS 
Until its deployment from the transporting spacecraft, the lander 
capsule i s  contained in a sterilization canister, which serves as a 
bio-barrier throughout the post- sterilization storage, launch, and 
interplanetary transit  mission phases. 
i s  little likelihood of recontamination during the pre-deployment 
phases if  the bio-barrier is adequately designed and functions a s  
planned. 
It has been shown that there 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY O F  RESULTS - SURVIVAL STUDIES 
0 r g anisms ecove red* 
x 10 2 
UHV AMBIENT -
4.89 
4.88 
4. 71 
4.94 
4.99 
4.21 
3. 70 
4.05 
3.38 
3.37 
3.38 
2.76 
3.21 
3.37 
3.11 
3.03 
4.32 
4.25 
4.07 
3.82 
4.30 
4.01 
4.03 
3.87 
4.56 
4.12 
3.87 
4.09 
4.19 
4.03 
4.31 
4.13 
UHV 
AMB 
113.1 
114,8 
115.7 
129.3 
116.0 
104.9 
91.8 
104.6 
74.1 
81.7 
87. 3 
67.4 
76.6 
83.6 
72. 1 
73.3 
-
Percentage Recovery 
UHV** AMBIENT** 
99.7 900 9 
99.5 89.4 
96.1 85.6 
100.8 80.4 
101.8 90.5 
85.9 84.4 
75.5 84.8 
82.6 81.4 
68.9 96,O 
68.7 86.7 
68.9 81.4 
56.3 84. 0 
65.5 88.2 
68.7 84.8 
63,4 90.7 
6.18 86.9 
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TABLE 1 - (Continued) 
SUMMARY O F  RESULTS - SURVIVAL STUDIES 
Organisms Recovered* 
x 106 
Percentage Recovery 
-
DAYS UHV AMBIENT UHV UHV** AMB=NT** 
AMB 
155 3.02 4.03 74.9 61.6 84.8 
170 2.95 4.10 71.9 60.1 86.3 
184 2.72 4.19 64.9 55.5 88.2 
198 2.84 4.00 71.0 57.9 84.2 
212 2.89 3.99 72.6 58.9 84.0 
226 2.61 4.26 61.2 53.2 89.6 
239 2.64 4.12 64.0 53.8 86.7 
2 54 2.38 3.92 60.7 48.5 82.5 
NOTE: 
not unusual when considering the large numbers of spores on each disc. 
The basic 100 percent inoculum of 4.90 x l o 6  for the UHV is an  average 
count as are the 4.94 x 10 6 and 4.99 x l o 6  values at 2 and 4 days, respectively. 
Thus, a percent recovery exceeding 100 percent could be expected if no die-off 
had occurred. 
The recovery values exceeding 100 percent at days 2 and 4 are 
Calculations corrected for dilution factors 
(an average of 15 counts per  entry) 
JI 'c
.I.& *r'c Percentage of inoculum placed on discs 
1) UHV 4.90 x l o 6  = 100% 
2) AMBIENT CONTROL 4.75 x l o 6  = 100% 
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On the other hand, it has been shown that large numbers of microbes 
a r e  likely to  survive the environmental profiles of launch and space 
flight and present recontamination hazards during the lander deploy- 
ment phase. 
into three categories: 
The particles giving r i s e  to  these hazards fall primarily 
1. 
the moment of canister lid separation; 
Particles located in line of sight of the unreleased lander at 
2. 
corridor by any deployment maneuver; and 
Large particles ejected directly toward the lander deployment 
3. 
attraction to the spacecraft. 
Small particles pulled into collision course with the lander by 
Particles of the first category can presumably be avoided by careful 
canister separation, joint design and proper location of the canister 
aperture with respect to  spacecraft protrusions, e. g . ,  solar panels. 
The presence of some particles in each of the remaining categories 
seems more o r  less  inevitable. 
The duration of the recontamination hazard is a function primarily 
of the intensity of solar radiation, the maximum size of contaminated 
particles present in significant numbers, and the magnitudes of elec- 
t r ic  potentials on the spacecraft and on small particles. 
case, estimates of the duration of the critical period after an ejection 
of particles i s  shown in Figure 2. 
For  a typical 
It i s  evident that the probability of recontamination is small during a 
carefully executed planetary landing mission. To begin to estimate 
exactly how small the probability is, it i s  necessary to consider in 
further detail specific circumstances of spacecraft and lander size 
and shape, environmental conditions, direction and speed of lander 
release,  distribution of contaminated particle sizes and velocities 
ejected, etc. 
Countermeasures proposed against the threats posed by these particles 
are: 
lid separation and spacecraft positioning maneuvers, and (2) application 
of a slight negative potential to the lander portion of the spacecraft. 
The effectiveness of these countermeasures under specific hypothetical 
circumstances needs further investigation. 
(1) an adequate delay of the release of the lander after canister 
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2.3 EFFECTS TESTS 
In light of the analytical study, the desirability of supporting experi- 
ments in several a reas  becomes apparent. In particular, it would 
be useful to have data regarding: 
0 acceleration levels required to release microbes 
e behavior of microbes when colliding with surfaces 
0 amount of charge readily picked up by microbes. 
Effects tes ts  were designed to contribute in this area. The f i rs t  of 
these was a vibrational test  which gave a measure of the ease with 
which organisms were released from a surface. A second group of 
experiments were conducted to measure some electrical properties 
of dried spores. 
The results of several vibration tes ts  a r e  summarized in the following 
Table 2. 
The results shown here a re  consistent with the conclusion that the 
largest spore clumps and perhaps a few individuals a r e  released by 
accelerations a s  low as 30 G or  less,  while the threshold for release 
of large numbers of single microbes l ies somewhere between 50 and 
7000 G. 
A ser ies  of qualitative observations were made in an attempt to de- 
termine how charged, dry spores would behave on impact with the 
skin of a spacecraft. 
A single pith ball 3/8-inch in  diameter was suspended near the dome 
of a small van der Graff generator with the generator not energized. 
A photograph was taken of this neutral position. 
was then started and the motion of the pith ball was observed. 
ditional exposures were made on the same plate to record typical 
positions of the pith ball. 
The van der Graff 
Ad- 
Several balls were prepared in four different ways and in the following 
table, the qualitative observations a r e  summarized. Approximate 
numerical values for the deflections a re  given. No significance should 
be given to their absolute values; the relative deflection i s  the important 
feature. 
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Duration of 
Ball-Dome Final 
Surface Preparation Contact Deflection 
None -1 sec. small (-1 in. ) 
Dry, Plain ball > 1  sec. medium (-5 in. ) 
Dry, Aluminum Painted <<1 sec. very large (-15 in. ) 
Dry, B. g. coated >1 sec. medium (-5 in. ) - - 
On the basis of our observation, we conclude that dry B. globigii 
spores can be treated a s  nonconducting spheres. They-will gen- 
erally not rebound from a smooth surface to which they a re  attracted 
by moderate electrostatic forces. 
2.4 Witness Techniques 
Evaluation of sterilization canister features that can induce recon- 
tamination or a r e  intended to reduce the possibility of recontamin- 
ation must be carried out utilizing techniques for witnessing the 
dispersion of organisms from the unsterile outer surfaces of the 
flight spacecraft. 
may be caused by release of elastic energy stored in mechanical 
clamp separation joints, s t ress  wave propagation through a structure 
caused by detonation of explosive devices such a s  separation joints; 
or  may result from inertial, shock or vibrational energies induced 
by functioning devices such a s  rocket motors. Also, the plume wash- 
ing of surface from rocket motor exhausts may be a means of release. 
The release of organisms from these surfaces 
The necessary decisions to be accomplished in preparation for dis- 
persion test measurements were the following: 
e The portion of the canister surface from which organisms 
would most logically be dispersed and the functioning item 
that would be the source of organism release energy. 
' The range in release velocities that would be of interest 
and hence the functioning time requirements to be placed 
upon the dispersion measuring device. 
@ The specific test setup and methods that would be employed 
in the witness technique tests. 
In this phase of the contract, separation tes ts  were performed utili- 
zing the test chamber shown in Figure 3. A r ip  cord explosive was 
12 
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FIGURE 3 ARTIST'S CONCEPTION O F  WITNESS DEVICE 
TEST SET-UP 
used for joint separation and Bacillus globigii spores used as the 
t racer  organism. 
record bacterial movements from the joint. 
simple mechanical witnessing device was established in these 
tests,  as well a s  the adequacy of the adopted inoculation and read- 
out procedures. However, the occurrence of unexpected ruptures 
in the explosive zip cord prevented recovery of valid angular and 
velocity dispersion data. The results of the test  series and con- 
clusions drawn a re  summarized in Table 3. 
Various collecting surfaces were utilized to 
The reliability of a 
2.5 STERILIZATION CERTIFICATION P U N  
2. 5. 1 Recontamination Model 
The total quarantine defense for a planetary contact mission is 
comprised of isolation of the sterilized lander within a mechanical 
bio-barrier designed to provide virtually complete sterility pro- 
tection until the spacecraft is in interplanetary space, and ad- 
ditional countermeasures taken to reduce the recontamination 
threat during and after the probe deployment mission phase. To 
aid in evaluating the adequacy of the bio-barrier concept and the 
relative need for additional countermeasures, a mathematical 
recontamination model was developed. 
Table 4 provides a definition of t e rms  used in the model. 
determine a total recontamination probability, it i s  necessary 
to design the mission so that known limits may be placed on two 
kinds of factors: (1) the probabilities that various conditions 
exist, e. g., bio-barrier puncture, etc., which give organisms 
at specific locations on the spacecraft opportunities for quaran- 
tine violation, and (2)  the probable distribution of organisms 
over the spacecraft and the probability of actual transport from 
the initial inoculation site to the sterile probe. 
category we denote broadly by the t e r m  I1opportunity probability 
factors, 
factors. 
To 
The former 
and the latter may be called transport probability 
We may summarize the proposed recontamination model in the 
following way: 
there is a probability Pi of a bio-barrier failure or  other op- 
portunity to contaminate, and that 
We imagine that during a given mission phase - i,
0 of an initial number of organisms N 
given spacecraft surface a rea  Ajs a certain portion PK 
positioned on a j* 
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TABLE 4 
DEFINITION OF TERMS FOR RECONTAMINATION MODEL 
Opportunity Probability Factors for Mission Phases and Events 
.Post terminal sterilization handling and storage p1 
p 2  Removal from storage, integration testing and mating 
P3 Launch operations and ascent 
p4 Canister venting to depressurize during ascent o r  just prior 
to lid opening 
P5 
P6 Course and velocity corrections 
P7 
Space cruise on interplanetary trajectory 
Canister lid opening and lid deployment 
Space cruise with lid open or  removed 
Probe deployment 
'8 
p9 
TransDort Probabilitv Factor s 
Pv Violation of an  opening in the bio-barrier 
Organism survival under exposure to space environment pK 
Existence of an organism along trajectory of probe 
Possible proIiferation and subsequent detection in experiments 
directly or  by alteration in ecology of organisms carried to 
target planet. 
pT 
pD 
17 
a r e  likely to have survived the mission environment 
profile from terminal sterilization to phase i, - 
e of these, a portion PT a r e  caused by some planned o r  
unplanned event to  be set on collision course with the 
steri le probe; however, 
0 for these, the probability of impact i s  Pv, which is 
the fraction of the bio-barrier opened or of the probe 
surface exposed, and finally, 
0 of these, we a r e  concerned only with the fraction PD 
which may survive descent to  the planet and be detected 
by life sensing experiments. 
Combining the foregoing factors, we obtain the expression 
for the probable (or  "expected") number <N> i, j of quarantine 
violations by organisms reaching the steri le probe from the 
surface element Aj, during the ith mission phase. In Equation 
(l),  the transport  probability factors PK . . . PD a r e  all given 
the subscripts i and j to  indicate that specific values a r e  as-  
sumed for each-combination of spacecraft surface a rea  element 
and mission phase or  violation opportunity. The total expected 
number of violations for a proposed mission is obtained by sum- 
ming the expected violations in all post sterilization mission 
phases from all surfaces of the spacecraft: 
The value of the above general formulation of the recontamination 
model is that the specific probability factors most critical in de- 
termining the total recontamination probability a r e  readily found 
by studying the individual <N> i, j t e rms  in detail. 
To satisfy the quarantine requirement, the value of CN> for a 
given mission design must be less  than the accepted contamin- 
ation probability for a single mission. 
it was concluded that a critical problem remaining to be solved 
is  the determination of meaningful l imits of the organism trans-  
port probability PT during the deployment mission phase. 
F rom study of the model, 
If 
1% 
this probability factor can be evaluated, the model can be used 
to  place a minimum upper limit on the spacecraft contamination 
burden consistent with meeting the COSPAR quarantine require- 
ment. 
2. 5. 2 Recommendation for Ground Test Certification 
The mission phases and events between terminal dry heat steri-  
lization and impact of the probe vehicle with the target planet 
have been considered in the recommendation of this section. 
These mission phases a r e  as follows: 
St or age test  
Prelaunch test  
Launch test  
Canister Venting test  
Cruise analy si s 
Course and velocity corrections analy si s 
Canister lid separation test  
The tes t s  that a r e  recommended to evaluate candidate canister 
designs for the recontamination threat that prevails for these 
phases and events a r e  shown adjacent to the above list of phases. 
The recontamination threat in the storage, prelaunch, and launch 
requires the simple exposure of a canister t o  an airborne micro- 
bial environment. The test  hardware would have to be carefully 
leak'checked in  the course of this test  se r ies  to monitor for 
leakage. This might be accomplished by pressurizing the canis- 
t e r  with helium and enclosing the canister in a larger container 
that i s  equipped with a helium mass  spectrometer. The environ- 
ment between the canister and the test  container could be densely 
charged with t r ace r  organism challenge. Internal to the canister, 
violation witness filter such as used in the experimental portions 
of this contract study could be employed to  capture violating 
organisms. 
loads, ascent loads and vibrations, and also should include a 
negative pressure test  within the ser ies  t o  examine the existence 
of violation paths that might not be detected by the leak monitor- 
ing. 
t e r  so that the specific location of a violation can be witnessed. 
F o r  dynamic simulation in vibration tes t s  of the series,  a 
dynamic model of the contained vehicle should be included. 
The tes t  should include simulation of the handling 
The filter would cover the entire inner surface of the canis- 
19 
Evaluation of the canister design in the final stage of the launch 
sequence i s  equivalent to  the cruise  mode except for the dynamic 
load environment. 
tainer storage environment tes t s  is believed sufficent for this 
mode. 
Analysis and the insight provided in the con- 
For  evaluation of the venting mode, simple tes t s  that employ 
only the venting mechanism - valves, f i l ter ,  etc. -- appear most 
productive. 
include backflow tes t s  of candidate fi l ters to provide insight into 
appropriate probabilities to be used. 
venting mechanism in assembly with the canister structure 
should be performed to  demonstrate the adequacy of the design. 
The design should include provision for monitoring the canister 
overpressure through the canister venting phase of the actual 
mi  s sion. 
The selection of the particular filter design should 
Subsequent tes t s  of the 
For  the cruise, and course and velocity correction modes, a 
tes t  program appears unwarranted due to  the complexity of the 
microbial environment and the impossibility of an adequate . 
ground simulation of that environment. 
discussed in the transport analysis section of this report. For  
these same reasons, t es t s  that fully represent the environment 
in the cruise with lid open and the probe deployment modes a r k  
not recommended. 
This consideration is 
The remaining mode is the lid separation event. 
environment during this event i s  equally constrained by the com- 
plex force fields that prevail. 
bered by the presence of the earth gravitational attraction. 
However, as has  been shown in the experimental test ,  dispersion 
and velocity of organisms released from a separation joint (or  
f rom other perturbed surfaces) can be measured by the technique 
developed in this program. 
pertains to t imes less  than one second. Witnessed violations 
beyond the one-second measurement time should not in them- 
selves indicate inadequacy of the design to  prevent recontamin- 
ation. In the design of lid separation devices, attention should 
be focused on designs that cause minimum perturbation such as 
heat induced melting of canister joints. 
of design adequacy must rely on analysis of the dispersion data 
and the consideration of transport analysis of this report. 
The microbial 
A ground tes t  i s  further encum- 
The validity of these measurements 
The final determination 
20 
3.0 SUGGESTED AREAS O F  FURTHER EFFORT 
The data summary presented in Section 2.0 of this report points out the ac- 
complishments of this study. This section outlines those a reas  of research 
in which further investigation would be profitable for both space related 
applications and basic biotechnology. In light of the work carried out and 
the results obtained in the current program, the following recommendations 
for further effort in Biotechnology a re  made: 
0 Microbial Survival Characteristics in Simulated Space Environments 
The main emphasis of the ultrahigh vacuum studies was to obtain 
data on organism survival over an extended time period, i. e . ,  
eight months, that would aid in  the development of a sterilization 
certification procedure. To our knowledge, investigations of this 
time duration have not been carried out prior to the current study. 
The consistently high recovery values of the ambient controls as 
observed in the current program a r e  quite significant -- other 
workers have reported definite death rates  fo r  organisms under 
similar conditions. 
fort be placed on determining the effect of surface type, surface 
finish, organism, population, humidity, light and other physical 
parameters on the survival t imes of organisms in both earth and 
simulated space environments. 
It is therefore recommended that further ef- 
Concerted efforts must be applied to the problem of microbial 
behavior in and reaction to simulated solar radiation. As our 
data and the results of others indicate, there a re  wide a reas  of 
uncertainty in obtaining statistically valid data. The problem 
centers on a shielding o r  protective effect provided by layering 
or  stacking of organisms. The problem of photo-reactivation 
also should be considered in detail. 
0 Evaluation of Recontamination Probability Factor s 
The analysis of recontamination hazards given in the technical 
report indicates that to minimize the probability of recontamin- 
ation during the deployment sequence, ejection of the lander 
probe from the opened canister should be accomplished with a 
minimum of vibration, and should be preceded by a quiescent 
period of perhaps an hour or more. This analysis does not in- 
dicate, however, the magnitude of recontamination probability 
during the period after canister lid jettison and before lander 
separation. This probability involves the distribution of particle 
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sizes, velocities, directions, etc. , released from various 
spacecraft points by the initial deployment maneuvers, the 
relative probability of trajectories which impact an unreleased 
lander, and the relative probability of contaminated particles 
being in  the lander deployment corridor when the lander i s  r e -  
leased. The foregoing factors depend, in turn, upon the initial 
burden on the spacecraft, the magnitude of deployment-associated 
mechanical vibrations, the details of the electric field environ- 
ment, spacecraft geometry and deployment orientation, planetary 
environment, etc. 
Many of the factors involved here  cannot be evaluated by analysis 
o r  simple experiment. Nonetheless, it m u l d  be meaningful to  
attempt to find out which particle size, re lease velocities, etc. , 
have a high probability of recontamination under given deploy- 
ment circumstances. 
the likely distributions of particle sizes, release velocities, etc. , 
we could then infer limits on the spacecraft burden released during 
deployment necessary to satisfy the COSPAR criteria. 
the especially menacing particle categories, it is suggested that 
typical deployment situations be simulated numerically on a com- 
puter. 
spacecraft environment during the deployment sequence and to  
determine the probable disposition of a hypothetical contaminated 
burden ejected from the spacecraft surface by some mechanical 
disturbance. 
and flexibility. 
count of various orientations of the spacecraft with respect to  the 
sun and the planet, plasma conditions at various altitudes above 
the planet, etc. Achievement of these objectives requires the 
solution of several  computer programming problems, which a r e  
listed below. 
Making certain assumptions regarding 
To find 
The task involved i s  to  simulate as well as possible the 
Provision must be made for considerable generality 
It should, for example, be possible to take ac- 
1. Spacecraft Structure 
2. Deployment Locale and Orientation 
3. Direct, Reflected and Thermal Radiation 
4. Gravitational Attraction 
5. Electromagnetic Field 
6. Analysis of Recontamirration Probability 
Orbital and Interplanetary Flight Tests 
It is not possible to precisely determine by analysis o r  land- 
based experiments alone the ultimate disposition of all surface 
contamination and launch debris carr ied aloft by a spacecraft. 
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Data directly relating to the fate of spacecraft contamination 
would be of great value to the total planetary quarantine effort. 
Such data may be obtained by simple, light-weight instrumen- 
tation added to scheduled NASA orbital and interplanetary flights. 
Examples of useful experiments are:  
1. Studies of the survival of microbial contamination on 
unprotected surfaces subjected to all normal flight vibrations. 
2. 
lease various kinds and sizes of surface bound particles 
after the surfaces have undergone normal launch exposure 
and vibration. 
Studies of acceleration and shock levels required to r e -  
3. 
a specified location on the spacecraft exterior. 
size, transport distance, and decay time of particle fallout 
a r e  among the variables of interest. 
Studies of the mobility of tagged particles released from 
Particle 
4. 
fallout and exposure to environment. 
various ways would be exposed during either o r  both the 
launch phase and the cruise phase of a mission. 
Study of the cumulative effects on surfaces of particle 
Surfaces prepared in 
5. 
lated metal plates on spacecraft surfaces facing and pointed 
away from the sun. 
Measurement of the potential difference between insu- 
6. 
medium. 
Measurement of electrical properties of the plasma 
The program of tes t s  conducted should seek data on both transient 
and long-term effects. 
ciding the demarcation between these two regimes. It would seem 
that many more meaningful results could be obtained if the parti- 
kipation of an astronaut was utilized, e. g. , to  initiate various 
t e s t s  at propitious time intervals, to retrieve samples and make 
the data stored on them secure, to make and record simple 
direction observations on suitable instruments. 
Matters of judgment a r e  involved in de- 
The design and planning of the proposed experiments must take 
into account the weight and space requirements of the apparatus, 
interfaces with other spacecraft systems, demands for attention 
by astronauts, etc. Consideration should therefore be given to  
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maximizing the data return for given amounts of weight, space, 
power, and t ime consumed. Consequently, a program would be 
necessary to  develop the most reliable and efficient data col- 
l e  ct ing t e chnique s , evaluate t rade - off between alter nat e exp e r  i - 
ments, and establishing priorities. Close communication would 
be maintained with NASA in firming up a final experiment 
schedule, integrating the experiment apparatus into the flight 
payload, instructing personnel in the use of the apparatus, etc. 
0 Ultracentrifuge Method for Testing Organism Release 
The binding force between an organism and a surface is one of 
the parameters studied in the Effects Tests  under this contract. 
Recently a ser ies  of papers by H. Krupp, et al, have come to 
our attention describing a technique for measuring this parameter. 
Basically, the technique i s  t o  place the particles on a conical 
surface in an ultra-centrifuge. When the centrifugal force exceeds 
the binding force, the particle i s  released. 
this technique to microbiology i s  straightforward and there i s  
every reason to  believe that useful measurements could be made. 
The application of 
Thus, these a reas  of investigation a r e  recommended for future 
effort in an attempt to  answer questions raised in the current 
program. 
the current space effort and a r e  applicable to  other a reas  of bio- 
technology such a s  food processing and hospital sanitation. 
significance and usefulness of the results of the current study will 
be verified by continuing investigation in these areas.  
The implications of the organism survival study exceed 
The 
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